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ABSTRACT 
The frequency of natural disasters occurrences has increased and is becoming noticed by many due to the 
impact on economy, society, and the environment.  
Decision making during disasters contributes towards community safety and resilience. Decisions taken to 
protect people from disasters have an impact on society, economy, environment, travel patterns, and reliability 
and performance of transport networks. Decisions often affect the performance of transport networks and critical 
infrastructure systems during disasters and during demand times.  
Decision making and decision styles which were observed during disaster events will show the areas that the 
decisions have worked well or created more risks to the society. Risks to the community due to environmental 
disasters are high, and they are worsened when integrated with poor decision making and actions. Good 
decision making provides for community resilience, good connectivity between cities, improved efficiency, safety 
to communities, and improved network reliability to all road users during disasters.  
This paper will examine decision-making scenarios used during disasters and how they impacted the community 
and provided for community resilience. The case study will identify ways to integrate decision making into 
disaster risk reduction and shows the decisions made during extreme events and how they impacted on the 
community and transport infrastructure. 
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1. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Decisions made during disasters will have numerous 
effects on the long-term performance of a country’s 
infrastructure as well as the resilience of 
communities. A research project conducted at RMIT 
University in collaboration with the City of Greater 
Geelong Council in Victoria, Australia, aimed to 
identify gaps in the decision-making process that 
contribute to risk and resilience of performance of 
critical infrastructure. Triple bottom line analysis was 
carried out to identify how decision making impacts 
the economy, environment, and the society. The 
process relied heavily on recorded case studies of 
natural disaster and decision-making failure and 
gaps. The overall research framework is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Decision intensity changes according to the dynamic 
nature of the disaster. Decisions made during normal 
day-to-day conditions against decisions made during 
disaster events have totally different decision-making 
styles. The impacts from these two decision-making 
scenarios will have numerous effects on the long-
term performance of a community’s resilience, 
economy, environment, and critical infrastructure.  
This paper focuses on the decision making during a 
disaster scenario to ascertain the impact and the 
gaps for improvement.  
2. DISASTERS 
There are many types of disasters which impact all 
countries, Natural and man-made hazards have the 
same end result of causing death for people and 
animals, destroying infrastructure, and causing 
damage to the economy of communities and 
countries. The effects of disasters are felt immediately 
in some instances, and in others it is felt at a later 
time. The secondary impacts could be the effects on 
critical infrastructure failures. A hazard is a physical 
event, phenomenon, or human activity that can cause 
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and 
economic disruption, or environmental degradation 
(Leoni, Radford,  &  Schulman, 2010). So  the  hazards  
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have the capability to directly cause damage and 
destruction or have a secondary impact. Disasters are 
a combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability, and 
insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the negative 
consequences of risk. A hazard becomes a disaster 
when it coincides with a vulnerable situation, such as 
when societies or communities are unable to cope using 
their own resources and capacities (Leoni et al., 2010). 
Disasters resulting from such natural hazards as 
tropical cyclones, windstorms, floods, and related 
landslides affect the most people. Such weather-
related disasters represented about 81% of all events, 
72% of all economic losses, and 23% of fatalities from 
2000–2010. On average, about 37 million people are 
affected every year by cyclones, hurricanes, and 
typhoons; nearly 366,000 by landslides; and 102 
million by floods (Leoni et al., 2010). Poor people are 
more affected by disasters than any other economic 
group. From 2000 to 2010, economic damage as a 
result of disasters totaled US $1 trillion; in 2010 alone, 
the total estimated damage was US $109 billion. 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the Americas had the 
highest percentage of people killed due to natural 
disasters in 2010. But, overall between 2000 and 
2009, the Asia region has the most number of 
disasters.  
Figure 4, shows the global economic damage due to 
hazards from 1970–2010. There is a sharp increase 
in hazards between 1995 and 2010. One reason 
could be the present-day availability of technology 
used to identify and determine the cost of disaster 
damages. 
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, floods and storms 
affect the most number of people, as well as cause 
many deaths. Therefore these two types of disasters 
are extremely common and deadly. Decision making 
for these types of disasters have to be treated with 
utmost care and respect. Throughout life, humans 
experience circumstances requiring them to make 
decisions involving probability information. These 
circumstances often require responding quickly, and 
the outcomes of these decisions can have life 
changing consequences (Andrzejewska et al., 2013). 
More than 226 million people are affected by disasters 
every year, and in 2010 alone, 373 disasters resulted 
in the deaths of 226,000 and affected 207,000 
persons. From 2000–2010, 400 disasters accounted 
for 98,000 deaths and 226,000 million affected each 
year. In total, 1,077,683 people lost their lives while 
2.4 billion were affected by disasters during the 
decade (Leoni et al., 2010). 
3. DECISION MAKING  
Decision making is one of the basic cognitive 
processes of human behaviors by which a preferred 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of people killed by disasters by region. 
Source: Leoni et al., 2010, p. 28 
 
 




Figure 4. Global economic damages from hazards, 1970-2010. 
Source: Leoni et al., 2010, p. 27 
 




Figure 6. Disaster occurrence by disaster type, Source: Leoni et 
al., 2010, p. 29 
 
Figure 7. Decision-making process 
 
Figure 8. Decision-making process. Source: FEMA, 2005 
 
Figure 9. The risk management process Source: International 
Organization for Standardization [ISO], n.d., p. 14 
option or a course of actions is chosen from among 
a set of alternatives based on certain criteria (Wang 
& Ruhe, 2007). People make decisions to carry out 
their daily tasks. In an organisation, decisions are 
made at every level and some get approved, 
discarded, or even stalled according to its culture 
and sometimes due to inherent bureaucratic 
processes. Decision makers are a special breed of 
people who are given the task to make responsible 
decisions, often from the responsible roles within 
organisations. Decisions are made to provide 
solutions to problems and to prevent a problem from 
being created; decision making creates many 
scenarios and actions that are connected with many 
outcomes. The outcomes of decisions change 
according to the dynamics of the situation. Also, the 
decision making depends on the decision maker’s 
abilities, characteristics, and approach towards 
reaching a solution.  
The decision making varies between normal-day 
decisions making to extreme-disaster-event decision 
making, such as natural weather events or even 
man-made disasters. Decision making during 
disasters changes the dynamics involved with 
decision-making processes and, most of the time, 
creates panic situations. Each decision changes 
according to the type of disaster and its magnitude. 
Decision making must be flexible, responsive, and 
capable of reacting to the unexpected in a timely and 
effective manner (Lahidji, 2003). All disasters impact 
people and communities, destroys or damages cities 
and critical infrastructure, and impacts the 
environment. But each disaster is different, and the 
decisions have to suit the needs and requirements. 
The time to evacuate a community to safety depends 
on the type of disaster and the available time to 
prepare and continue with the evacuation processes. 
As shown in Figure 7, any person or a group of 
people can make decisions, but only a few can 
contribute toward a good outcome. To do this the 
decision makers have to have the required skill sets. 
But is it this simple or complicated when the cost of a 
human life was estimated at $9.1 million by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 (Partnoy, 
2012).  
Figure 8 shows a typical decision-making and 
problem-solving process, which states that problem 
solving is a set of activities designed to analyze a 
situation systematically and find, implement, and 
evaluate solutions. At each stage, a decision is 
required, and it is a mechanism for making choices 
at each step of the problem-solving process. 
Decision making is part of problem solving, and 
decision making occurs at every step of the problem-
solving process (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency [FEMA], 2005). Figure 9 shows a typical risk-
management process, which has similar steps in 
identifying the issues and drawing up solutions to 
address the risk. In both these processes, decisions 
are required to provide solutions. During a disaster 
event, the main aim of the decision maker should be 
to save as many lives as possible. Therefore, 
decision making becomes an important element in 








carries a certain amount of responsibility and 
accountability. Decisions taken during disaster 
events impact a larger community and business 
audience and impacts on community, economy, and 
the environment. Managing a response to 
catastrophic incident requires timely, effective 
decision making and a systematic management 
approach that applies sound tested principles (U.S. 
Department of Transportation [USDOT & U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2006). 
Therefore, it is important to identify the decision 
maker’s capabilities before they are faced with a 
critical event. Decision making and management 
capabilities are critical to developing and 
implementing a successful emergency response 
plan (USDOT & DHS, 2006). The economic impact 
of large-scale disasters is significant at the local 
level, with physical destruction on a large magnitude, 
losses of lives, disruption or interruption of business 
output, and sharp declines in consumption (Lahidji, 
2003). 
Hurricane Katrina was a wakeup call for the United 
States, in that the hurricane revealed very significant 
deficiencies in the nation’s ability to manage 
catastrophic events (Tierney, 2009). Then there is 
this question: how do we detect or identify a disaster 
and how do we plan for such a disaster? How do we 
communicate the disaster to the people who will be 
impacted by this hazard, and who is responsible for 
taking correct action to notify the people and all 
relevant organizations? In the aftermath of a 
disaster, governments face considerable pressure to 
intervene: to reduce or contain persisting dangers, 
compensate victims, clean up and reconstruct 
damaged areas, provide temporary shelters, 
subsidise affected industries and local governments, 
prevent liquidity crises, and restore confidence. In 
some cases in the past, the fiscal costs of disaster 
response have exceeded 1% of GDP for several 
years (Lahidji, 2003). The decision maker will take 
action according to a set number of priorities, such 
as saving people is more important than saving 
critical infrastructure or vice versa. Therefore, the 
person responsible for making these critical 
decisions need to have the capability to understand 
the intensity of the hazard and have situational 
awareness of the affected area. Disasters can affect 
everyone and are, therefore, everybody’s business 
(Leoni et al., 2010). 
In the United States, the National Response Plan 
defines a catastrophic incident as: “Any natural or 
man-made incident, including terrorism that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or 
disruption severely affecting the population, 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national  
 
morale, and/or government functions.” A catastrophic 
event could result in sustained national impacts over 
a prolonged period of time; almost immediately 
exceeds resources normally available to State, local, 
tribal, and private sector authorities in the impacted 
area; and significantly interrupts governmental 
operations and emergency services to such an 
extent that national security could be threatened. 
(Townsend, 2006). 
3.1. Decision-Making Styles 
There are many decision-making styles used by 
decision makers. As shown in Table 1, to arrive at a 
decision, many types of decision-making styles can 
be used.  
The actions that are emitting from each decision are 
different and the mitigation of the impact on the 
society, economy, environment and critical 
infrastructure also differs. Decision making also 
depends on the culture of the organisation and size 
of the organisation. 




makes all the relevant 
decisions 
Individual Decision Making: In 
individual decision making, the leader 
must make the decision alone, and 
input from others is limited to collecting 
relevant information. 
Pseudo-consultative Decision Making Through 
Consultation: In consultation, the 
leader shares the issue with one or 
more people—seeking ideas, opinions, 
and suggestions—and then makes a 
decision. The leader considers the 
input of others, but the final decision 





Delegating the Decision: When 
delegating a decision, the leader sets 
the parameters then allows one or 
more others to make the final decision. 
Although the leader does not make the 
decision, he or she supports it. 
Democratic Where everyone has an opportunity to 





The decisions are made according to 
results, empirical analysis, and also 




In this case, the leader and others work 
together until they reach a consensus 
decision. Each group member’s 
opinion and point of view is considered. 
As a result of helping to make the 
decision, group members buy into the 
final decision and commit to supporting 
its implementation. 
 
3.2. Factors That Influence Decision Making 
As shown in Table 2, the decisions are influenced by 
many factors. 
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3.3. Responsibilities of a Decision Maker 
A responsible decision maker should have the 
knowledge about the situation and be able to carry 
out a situational analysis; available resources to 
carry out the whole process of decision making, 
implementation and other related requirements; 
team capabilities; able to understand the constraints 
and available time; and the level of collaboration, 
available technology, and experienced staff. 
3.4. Characteristics of a Decision-Making Process  
Defined process or framework/clear and transparent 
steps in the process/inclusiveness of all 
stakeholders/leadership 
People have different styles of making decisions that 
depend on their personality or psychological type. 
Psychological type is a composite of our preferences 
or preferred ways of taking in and organizing 
information. We tend to favor one of four ways of 
approaching a problem: 
Decisions can be as simple as delegating a routine 
task or as complex as responding to a major crisis. 
Decision making in a crisis is made more difficult 
because of stress. 
The other area that has a bigger impact on decision 
making is the management structure. This may vary 
between having a rigid vertical communication 
structure to a flat one or even have a high degree of 
coordination and formulation  structures. As per  the  
Table2. Factors which influences decision making 





decision maker  
Experience of past 
practice 











Financial factors Environmental 
factors 
Safety factors 
Ethical factors Organisational 
Culture 
Size of organization 
 
Table 3. Leadership characteristics for emergencies and disasters 




Managing teams and 
team building 





Strategic Planning Network and 
Partnering 
Decision Making 
Source: FEMA, 2005 
Table 4. Attributes of an effective decision maker 
Knowledge.  The most important requirement for 
making sound decisions is a deep 
understanding of all factors. The 
soundness of the decision depends on 
how informed the decision maker is. 
Initiative.  Effective decision makers assume 
responsibility for beginning the decision-
making process and seeing it through. 
They take an active 
part in making things better. 
Advice-seeking.  Good decision makers know that they 
need help from others. They identify 
people who can make specific 
contributions to the decision-making 
process and ask them for their advice 
and counsel. 
Selectivity.  Effective decision makers seek pertinent 
data. They avoid getting bogged down by 
extraneous facts and figures. 
Comprehensiveness.  On the other hand, they look at all 
available options and consider every 
possible alternative so as to make the 
best choice. 
Currency. Good decision makers consider current 
conditions and take advantage of 
opportunities that exist at the time. 
Flexibility. Effective decision makers remain open-
minded about new concepts and ideas. 
They are willing to change course or try a 
different approach if better results seem 
likely. 
Good judgment. Sound decisions will not always result 
from merely following procedures. 
Decision makers must exercise their best 
judgment in considering factors particular 
to the situation. 
Calculated risk-
taking. 
The risks and results of various 
alternatives must be weighed and the 
consequences accepted, whether 
positive or negative. 
Self-knowledge. Good decision makers know their own 
abilities, biases, and limitations. 
Source: FEMA, 2005 
 
Table 5. Decision maker’s qualities 
Charismatic: final decisions based on 
balanced information 
Feeling (integrity) 
Thinker: looks for extensive details Thinking (effectiveness) 
Sceptic: decides based on gut feelings Intuition (innovation) 
Follower: relies heavily on own or 
other past decisions to make current 
choices 
Sensing (stability) 
Controller: only implements own ideas  
Source: FEMA, 2005 
 










Lack of information. Uncertainty. 
High- or low-
blood sugar 
levels as a result 
of erratic eating 
patterns. 
  
Source: FEMA, 2005 
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Table 7. Decisions made under stress 
Under stress, 
decision makers are 
more likely to: 
Decision makers 
under stress 
also tend to: 
They may also: 
 
Experience conflict 
with other key players. 















to handle difficult 
tasks and work 
productively. 
Choose a risky 
alternative. 
Perceive selectively 
because of sensory 








Get tunnel vision.  
Succumb to 
“groupthink.” 
Source: FEMA, 2005 
 
 
Figure 10. Hurricane strikes (1950–2009). Source: 
http://www.californiaacontractor.com/track_map.htm 
 




Figure 12. Hurricane paths and intensities. Source: 
http://blog.cleanenergy.org/2011/09/05/how-wind-farms-weather-
hurricanes/ 
case study, the selected stakeholders are U.S. 
Congress, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
FEMA, governors and mayors, Department of 
Defence (DoD), and Department of Justice (DoJ). 
These organisations have different communication 
and decision-making styles. When each organisation 
has to coordinate between each other, then the 
cracks start to appear. 
4. CASE STUDY: HURRICANE KATRINA 
Risk is the probability of harmful consequences or 
expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, 
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted, or 
environment damaged) resulting from interactions 
between natural or human-induced hazards and 
vulnerable populations (Leoni et al., 2010). 
The report has selected 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. 
The case study is divided into two sections, 
Prelandfall and Postlandfall. 
4.1 Prelandfall Facts  
Figure 10 shows the Hurricane strikes from 1950–
2009 in the Gulf Coast Region, and Figure 11 shows 
the tropical storms and hurricanes from 1851—2004 
in the same region. Figure 12 shows the intensities 
of the hurricanes. Therefore, from Figures 10—12, it 
is shown that hurricanes and storms in the Gulf are 
not new phenomena. This has been happening very 
frequently throughout the Gulf. 
The Mississippi Deltaic Plain (MDP) is a 25,000 sq. 
km dynamic landscape of water, wetlands, and low 
upland ridges formed as a series of overlapping 
delta lobes. (Day et al., 2007). Since 1559, 172 
hurricanes have struck southern Louisiana; of these, 
38 have caused flooding in New Orleans, usually via 
Lake Pontchartrain (Rogers, 2008). Therefore, the 
Katrina disaster cannot be classified as a surprise, in 
both the short and long term. Ample warning of the 
coming disaster was met with insufficient preparation 
(Moynihan, 2009). Furthermore, “Katrina was the 
much anticipated natural disaster in American history 
and still government managed to fail at every level” 
(Sobel & Leeson, 2006). “Hurricanes strike the 
Louisiana coast with a mean frequency of two every 
three years” (Rogers, 2008). Seventy-five hurricanes 
of Katrina’s strength at landfall—a Category 3—have 
hit the mainland United States since 1851, roughly 
once every two years (Townsend, 2006). 
Figure 13 shows the hurricane category by the wind 
speeds. 
4.2. New Orleans  
The New Orleans Metropolitan area is home to 
approximately 1.4 million inhabitants (Wolshon, 
2002). New Orleans has one of the highest poverty 
rates (28%)  in the  United  States  (Fox  &  Gibbons, 
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Figure 13. Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale 
2005). A 2000 census revealed that 27% of New 
Orleans households, amounting to approximately 
120,000 people, were without privately owned 
transportation (Fox & Gibbons, 2005). Another report 
states, “It is estimated that about 200,000 to 300,000 
people do not have access to reliable personal 
transportation” (Wolshon, 2002). Within the city of 
New Orleans an elaborate system of drainage 
collection, pumping, conveyance, and discharge has 
been developed over the past hundred years, and 
Rogers (2008) adds that, “New Orleans has always 
been a high maintenance city for drainage and 
receives an average rainfall of about 132cm per 
year.” Further, the protection levee along Lake 
Pontchartrain was erected after the 1893 hurricane 
which generated a storm surge of up to 4 metres, 
and federal involvement with the city’s drainage 
canals began in 1955 with approval of the Lake 
Pontchartrain and vicinity hurricane projection 
project by Congress (Rogers, 2008). The report goes 
on to state that, “Since 1928 the flood protection 
along Mississippi River has been provided chiefly by 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Mississippi River 
and Tributaries project” (Rogers, 2008). All of New 
Orleans and southeast Louisiana are highly 
vulnerable to catastrophic flooding for flood events 
that are in the neighbourhood of 0.2% or the 500-
year return period (Link, 2010). In southeast 
Louisiana, communities unprotected by levees were 
inundated, and the storm destroyed levees 
protecting eastern New Orleans and the St. Bernard 
and Plaquemines parishes to the south and east 
(Day et al., 2007). 
4.3. Postlandfall Facts 
“Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural 
disasters in our nation’s history and has caused 
unimaginable devastation and heartbreak throughout 
the Gulf Coast Region. A vast coastline of towns and 
communities has been decimated,” said President 
George W. Bush on September 8, 2005 (Townsend, 
2006). 
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina created a trail of 
destruction with wind speeds of 145 mph (232km/hr) 
and storm surge of 27 feet (8.2 metres) across 
93,000 sq. miles (240,861 sq. km), killed over 1,300 
people, and is considered as the most destructive 
natural disaster in U.S. history. 
The storm surge it created along a stretch of the 
northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama to New 
Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 sq. miles of our 
nation—roughly an area the size of Great Britain 
(Townsend, 2006). 
The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or 
even one state. Individual local and state plans, as 
well as relatively new plans created by the Federal 
Government since the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, failed to adequately account for 
widespread or simultaneous catastrophes 
(Townsend, 2006). The report further adds that, the 
consequences for New Orleans, which sits mostly 
below sea level, were dire. Significant levee failures 
occurred on the 17th Street Canal, the Industrial 
Canal, and the London Avenue Canal. The flooding 
destroyed New Orleans, the nation’s 35th largest city 
(Townsend, 2006). 
Over an estimated 18-hour period, approximately 
80% of the city flooded with 6 to 20 feet of water, 
necessitating one of the largest search-and-rescue 
operations in our nation’s history caused by 
breaches in its 350 mile levee system (Townsend, 
2006). 
The hurricane devastated CI power infrastructure in 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The storm 
surge damaged infrastructure systems and service 
facilities, regional potable water systems, 
wastewater treatment systems and sewage 
treatment plants, cooling towers at oil refineries, 
chemical plants, power stations, highway bridges. 
Super structures were damaged costing close to 
$100 billion, residential structure and content 
damages of $75 billion, electric utility damages of 
$231 million, highway damages of $3 billion, sewer 
system damages of $1.2 billion, completely 
destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 
300,000 homes, and commercial revenue losses of 
$4.6 billion . 
There was an extensive loss of traffic-control devices 
such as traffic lights, regulatory signs, and directional 
signs. Flooding blocked access to the police and fire 
dispatch centers and prevented fire crews from 
being able to suppress burning fires. Local 
emergency response officials found it difficult or 
impossible to establish functioning incident 
command structures in these conditions. The federal 
response suffered from significant organization and 




Figure 14. U.S natural disasters that caused the most deaths and 
damage to property in each decade (Townsend, 2006). 
 
Table 8. Estimated damage from Hurricane Katrina and the New 
Orleans Flood 
 
Officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without a 
comprehensive understanding of the 
interdependencies of the critical infrastructure 
sectors in each geographic area and the potential 
national impact of their decisions. 
The dark blue bars in Figure 14 show the decreasing 
number of deaths caused by natural disasters in the 
period from 1900—2005. The light blue bars show 
the increasing amount of damage caused by these 
same natural disasters adjusted to third-quarter 2005 
dollars (Townsend, 2006). 
Hurricane Katrina’s damage was extensive. The 
storm destroyed so many homes, buildings, forests, 
and green spaces that an extraordinary amount of 
debris was left behind—118 million cubic yards 
(Townsend, 2006). 
When the winds and floods of Hurricane Katrina 
subsided, an estimated 1,330 people were dead as a 
result of the storm. The vast majority of the 
fatalities—an estimated 80%—came from the New 
Orleans metropolitan area. Of the total known 
fatalities, there are almost 200 unclaimed bodies 
remaining at the Victim Identification Center in 
Carville, Louisiana. As of February 17, 2006, there 
were still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area 
reported missing. Around 770,000 people were 
displaced—the largest since the Dust Bowl migration 
from the southern Great Plains region in the 1930s 
(Townsend, 2006). 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau the city of New 
Orleans has approximately 484,000 residents of 
which approximately 130,000 live under the poverty 
line, an estimated 27% in comparison to the national 
rate of 12% (Talbot, Goldberg, & Carr, 2005). 
5. DECISION-MAKING GAPS IN THE SYSTEM 
Decisions taken during Hurricane Katrina are 




• The White House shares responsibility for the inadequate 
prelandfall preparations. To be sure, President Bush, at the 
request of Brown, did take the initiative to personally call 
Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation.  
Correct Decisions: 
• On September 26, 2005, President Bush urged Congress to 
consider amending the Posse Comitatus Act in order for the 
U.S. forces to take control without delay in the aftermath of a 
disaster. The Posse Comitatus Act is a federal ruling that 
limits the ability of the government to use arm forces to 
respond to domestic events such as floods. 
• He also took the unusual step of declaring an emergency in 
the Gulf Coast States prior to Katrina’s landfall. 
Substandard Decisions: 
• The White House failed to deconflict varying damage 
assessments and discounted information that ultimately 
proved accurate. 
• On the other hand, the President did not leave his Texas 
ranch to return to Washington until two days after landfall, 
and only then convened his Cabinet, as well as a White 
House task force, to oversee federal response efforts. 
• Throughout Monday, the day of the storm, the President 
maintained his regular schedule. In the morning, he 
celebrated Senator John McCain’s birthday at Luke Air Force 
Base near Phoenix, Arizona. He also spoke to the people in 
the Gulf Coast region, offering that, “When the storm passes, 
the federal government has got assets and resources that we 
will be deploying to help you. 
• Despite these reports of a catastrophe, the White House 
failed to grasp the gravity of the situation as it unfolded. As a 






• When effective response is beyond the capabilities of the 
state and the affected local governments, the Stafford Act 
provides for federal assistance upon the request of the state 
and local governments. 
• Federal departments and agencies were required to develop 
supporting operational plans and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) to integrate their activities into the 
national response. In almost all cases, the integrating SOPs 
were either nonexistent or still under development when 
Hurricane Katrina hit. 
• The Federal Government had the Authority to Assist with 
Pre-Landfall Evacuation, Even in the Absence of a Request 
for Assistance from State and Local Governments. 
Substandard Actions: 
• The Federal government did not reach out to state or local 
authorities about transportation alternatives for those lacking 
means for prelandfall evacuation. 
• Lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters level 
reflected confusing organizational structures in the field.  
• The lack of communications and situational awareness had a 
debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after 
coordinating elements were in place, Federal departments 
and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their 
standard procedures to this catastrophic incident. 
• The Federal response suffered from significant organization 
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and coordination problems during this week of crisis.  
• The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane 
Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in 
our current national preparedness system: the lack of 






• Homeland Security takes the lead in coordinating the 
response to provide supplies, help with cleanup, and 
provide aid to those whose homes are destroyed.  
Gaps: 
• Our current system for homeland security does not provide 
the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed 
by twenty-first-century catastrophic threats. 
Failures: 
• The Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide 
valuable situational information to the White House and key 
operational officials during the disaster. 
 
• Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had 
unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibilities 
that were exposed as flawed during this disaster.
 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
  
Statutory authorities and presidential directives establish the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the central federal 
entity for preparedness for and response to disasters.  
 
Responsibilities: 
Authorities invested DHS with at least four categories of 
responsibility:  
1. Leadership.  
a. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
has clear duties to lead and manage the federal response 
to disasters such as Katrina.  
b. He carries ultimate responsibility for managing FEMA and 
other DHS components and is charged with coordinating 
overall federal operations.  
c. The Secretary must marshal federal resources, decide 
whether to appoint a Principal Federal Official to lead the 
federal response on the ground, and decide whether to 
implement the Catastrophic Incident Annex, which 
provides for an accelerated, proactive national response to 
a catastrophic incident. 
2. Coordination and Support.  
a. DHS can use various structures and resources to 
coordinate and support the overall response effort.  
b. Recommendations to the Secretary, who has the power to 
activate the IIMG based on the nature, severity, 
magnitude, and complexity of a threat or incident. 
3. Operational Responsibilities.  
a. DHS has significant, ground-level operational 
responsibilities in responding to disasters.  
b. DHS and its component agencies are primary or 
coordinating agencies for nine of the 15 Emergency 
Support Functions (ESFs) in the NRP—categories of 
federal capabilities that can be brought to bear to provide 
support in domestic incidents—including public safety and 
security, communications support, and emergency 
management. 
c. DHS components such as the Coast Guard also have 
significant missions and statutory responsibilities 
independent of the NRP. 
4. Preparedness.  
a. Besides its response roles, DHS has primary responsibility 
for strengthening national preparedness—including the 
planning, training, and equipment necessary to prevent, 
respond to, and recover from major domestic incidents—
under HSPD-8 and the Homeland Security Act. 
b. Section 502 of the Homeland Security Act gives the 
Secretary, acting through the FEMA Director, responsibility 
for “helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency 
response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies.” 
c.  The Department has authority over primary grants and 
training programs for state and local first responders and 
emergency managers. Pursuant to HSPD-8, DHS has 
developed a National Preparedness Goal, establishing 
national emergency-management and preparedness 
priorities. 
d.  DHS ties its preparedness requirements to grant funding, 
requiring that all states submit emergency plans in order to 
get funding and that the money be used to meet the 
capabilities and priorities set forth by the National 
Preparedness Goal. 
5. DHS has assumed responsibilities under the Robert T. 
Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). 
Stafford Act authorizes and provides the administrative 
mechanisms for the federal government to assist state and 
local governments in disasters. 
6. DHS was created to bring together multiple, disparate 
agencies to create synergy and ensure a coordinated 
approach to preventing, preparing for, and responding to 
catastrophes, whether caused by terrorism or nature. 
Failures: 
• DHS leaders failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal 
government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina. 
• DHS did not fully adapt or adequately train to meet its 
obligations under the NRP before Hurricane Katrina.  
• Nor did the Department address the known deficiencies of 
FEMA, such as staffing shortages, inadequate training, poor 
commodities tracking, and insufficient plans for post-disaster 
communications. 
• In the critical days before landfall, DHS leadership mostly 
watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead, 
and missed critical opportunities to help prepare the entire 
federal government for the response.  
• The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is 
charged with preparing for and responding to domestic 
incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed 
to lead an effective federal response to Hurricane Katrina. 
•  DHS was slow to recognize the scope of the disaster or that 
FEMA had become overwhelmed. 
•  DHS—as the Department charged with preparing for and 
responding to domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or 
natural disasters—failed to effectively lead the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina.  
• DHS and its leaders failed to prepare the nation adequately 
for the unprecedented devastation of Hurricane Katrina. 
• DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency to the 
federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and 
Secretary Chertoff himself should have been more engaged 
in preparations over the weekend before landfall. 
 
Secretary of Homeland Security 
Responsibilities: 
• The Secretary of Homeland Security, is the President’s 
principal Federal official for domestic incident management, 
but he had difficulty coordinating the disparate activities of 
Federal departments and agencies. 
• The Secretary of Homeland Security has a clear duty to lead 
and manage the federal response to disasters such as 
Katrina. 
• The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident 
Annex to direct the federal response posture to fully switch 
from a reactive to proactive mode of operations. Absent the 
Secretary’s invocation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, 




• During actual or potential Incidents of National Significance, 
the overall coordination of federal incident management 
activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. 
• It also made the Secretary responsible for developing and 
administering the National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
• decisions made by DHS leadership weakened FEMA and 
impeded its ability to respond to disasters. 
Substandard Decisions: 
• Secretary Chertoff failed to appoint a Principal Federal 
Official (PFO), the official charged with overseeing the 
federal response under the NRP, until 3 hours after landfall. 
• Secretary Chertoff failed to make ready the full range of 
federal assets pursuant to DHS’s responsibilities under the 
National Response Plan (NRP). 
• With local and state resources immediately overwhelmed, 
rapid federal mobilization of resources was critical. Yet 
reliable information on such vital developments as the levee 
failures, the extent of flooding, and the presence of 
thousands of people in need of life-sustaining assistance at 
the New Orleans Convention Center did not reach the White 
House, Secretary Chertoff , or other key officials for hours, 
and in some cases more than a day 
• Secretary Chertoff made only top-level  inquiries into 
the state of preparations, and accepted uncritically the 
reassurances he received. 
• He did not appear to reach out to the other Cabinet 
secretaries to make sure that they were readying their 
departments to provide whatever assistance DHS—and the 
people of the Gulf Coast—might need. 
• Similarly, had he invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex of 
the National Response Plan (NRP-CIA), Secretary Chertoff 
could have helped remove uncertainty about the federal 
government’s need and authority to take initiative before 
landfall and signaled that all federal government agencies 
were expected to think—and act—proactively in preparing for 
and responding to Katrina. 
Failures: 
• The Secretary lacked real-time, accurate situational 
awareness of both the facts from the disaster area as well as 






• FEMA has responsibilities in both disaster response and 
recovery.  
• Response includes actions taken during or after an 
emergency.  
• Recovery involves short-term activities to return life-support 
systems after an emergency—such as rebuilding and assisting 
victims in dealing with damage caused by a disaster. 
• Once the 17th Street Canal levee had been breached and the 
city was overwhelmed it was FEMA's responsibility  
to step in. 
Substandard Decisions: 
• FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, lacked the 
leadership skills that were needed. Before landfall, Brown did 
not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical personnel 
and equipment, and will fully failed to communicate with DHS 
Secretary, Michael Chertoff, to whom he was supposed to 
report.  
• Brown and most of his front-office staff had little or no 
emergency-management experience prior to joining FEMA. 
• Brown, then in Louisiana, contributed to the problem by 
refusing to communicate with Secretary Chertoff, opting 
instead to pass information directly to White House staff. 
• Brown sent a single employee, without operational expertise 
or equipment and from the New England region to New 
Orleans before landfall. 
• the leadership at the time of Katrina also lacked basic 
management experience and the leadership ability required 
to coordinate the entire federal government’s response to a 
catastrophic event. 
• circumvented his chain of command and failed to 
communicate critical information to the Secretary 
•  failed to deliver on commitments made to Louisiana’s 
leaders for buses 
• travelled to Baton Rouge with FEMA public-affairs and 
congressional-relations employees and a personal aide, and 
no operational experts 
• failed to adequately carry out responsibilities as FEMA’s lead 
official in the Gulf before landfall and when he was appointed 
as the Principal Federal Official after landfall. 
Failures: 
• FEMA failed to adequately develop emergency-response 
capabilities assigned to it under the National Response Plan. 
• FEMA’s senior political appointees, including Director 
Michael Brown and Deputy Director Patrick Rhode, had little 
or no prior relevant emergency-management experience 
before joining FEMA. 
• FEMA was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale 
of Katrina. 
• FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, 
interfering with the management of supplying food, water, 
ice, and other vital commodities to those in need across the 
Gulf Coast. 
• Michael Brown, FEMA’s Director, was insubordinate, 
unqualified, and counterproductive  
• failed to organize FEMA’s or other federal eff orts in any 
meaningful way. 
• FEMA had budget shortages that hindered its preparedness. 
• FEMA’s emergency-response teams were inadequately 
trained, exercised, and equipped. 
• Prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA suffered from a number of 
problems: unqualified senior political leadership, budget 
shortages, personnel shortages, and inadequate response 
capabilities. 
• FEMA tried to get additional funding from DHS, but the 
requests were generally denied 
• Over the last few years, FEMA has operated with a 15 to 20 
percent vacancy rate; many positions cannot be filled 
because of budget shortages 
• FEMA is a small agency with approximately 2,500 permanent 
full-time employees. Over the last few years, FEMA has 
suffered numerous personnel problems, hindering its ability 
to prepare for and respond to a catastrophic event. 
• The ability of FEMA to respond to a natural disaster of this 
magnitude had not been tested under the Bush 
Administration. 
 
National Response Plan (NRP)  
 
• National Response Plan released in December of 2004. 
• The NRP further confirms DHS’s central role in disaster 
preparedness and response. 
• The National Response Plan (NRP) was intended to form the 
basis of the federal government’s response to disasters and 
for its interaction with state and local governments during 
such events. 
• One main element of the National Preparedness System is 
the National Response Plan (NRP). 
Failures: 
• Under the current response framework, the Federal 
government merely “coordinates” resources to meet the 
needs of local and State governments based upon their 
requests for assistance. 
• This lack of understanding of the “National” plan not 
surprisingly resulted in ineffective coordination of the 
Federal, State, and local response. 
• the response to Katrina did not go as planned is that The 
NRP was relatively new to many at the Federal, State, and 
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local levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina. 
• The Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) did not function 
as envisioned in the NRP. 
• The National Response Plan’s Mission Assignment process 
proved to be far too bureaucratic to support the response to 
a catastrophe. 
• in that it clearly defines the roles and interagency 
responsibilities for the management of all disasters as 
deemed by DHS to be incidents of national significance. 
• This framework does not address the conditions of a 
catastrophic event with large scale competing needs, 
insufficient resources, and the absence of functioning local 
governments. 
• Consequently, some of the specific procedures and 
processes of the NRP were not properly implemented, and 
Federal partners had to operate without any prescribed 
guidelines or chains of command. 
 
Gov. Kathleen Blanco 
 
Correct Decisions: 
• On August 26, 2005, Governor Blanco declared a state of 
emergency in order to initiate the pre-positioning of Federal 
commodities at Federal Operations Staging Areas (FOSA’s). 
• Once Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency FEMA 
Logistics pre-positioned commodities such as ice, water and 
Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) at the closest FOSAs. 
Substandard Decisions: 
• Governor Blanco Did Not Request Transportation Resources 
From the Federal Government for Pre-landfall Evacuation. 
• Gov. Kathleen Blanco was aware that she needed help but 
due to lack of constant communication and competency in 
dealing with disasters, did not know what to ask for. 
• New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor 
Kathleen Blanco—who knew the limitations of their resources 
to address a catastrophe—did not specify those needs 
adequately to the federal government before landfall. For 
example, while Governor Blanco stated in a letter to 
President Bush, two days before landfall, that she anticipated 
the resources of the state would be overwhelmed, she made 
no specific request for assistance in evacuating the known 
tens of thousands of people without means of transportation, 
and a senior State official identified no unmet needs in 
response to a federal offer of assistance the following day. 
 
The Mayor  
 
Responsibilities: 
• the Mayor, who was supposed to be in charge of the 
emergency operations, was rarely seen in the EOC. 
Substandard Decisions: 
• Delayed mandatory Evacuation order 
• had used the Superdome twice prior to Hurricane Katrina as 
a shelter of last resort. The first time, during Hurricane 
Georges it turned out to be a disaster and the second time, 
During Hurricane Ivan it proved to be better organized. 
Unfortunately, its use during Hurricane Katrina fared not so 
well once again. 
• On August 28, 2005 Mayor Nagin made evacuation of the 
city mandatory. 
 
Failures and Key Findings 
 
Findings: 
• The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and 
synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout 
the Federal government, but also with the State and local 
governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well. 
• Following a catastrophic disaster, the traditional mode of 
operation may not work if state and local governments are so 
overwhelmed that they can’t effectively make specific 
requests for assistance. In such circumstances the National 
Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex provides for a 
more proactive federal response. 
• Under our system of federalism, state and local governments 
bear the primary responsibility for responding to 
emergencies. As such, they generally manage the response 
to an incident in the first instance. 
• Four overarching factors contributed to the failures of 
Hurricane Katrina: 
o long-term warnings went unheeded and government 
officials neglected their duties to prepare for a 
forewarned catastrophe 
o government officials took insufficient actions or made 
poor decisions in the days immediately before and after 
landfall 
o systems on which officials relied to support their 
response eff orts failed, and 
o Government officials at all levels failed to provide 
effective leadership. 
• Many Residents Disregarded the Mandatory Evacuation 
Orders Due to Complacency, Poor Evacuation Experiences, 
and Insufficient Financial Resources to Support Themselves 
and Their Families on the Road. 
• The Director of the City of New Orleans Office of Emergency 
Preparedness Turned Down Offers of Assistance With the 
Pre-landfall Evacuation From the Regional Transit Authority 
(RTA). 
Failures: 
• The City of New Orleans Failed to Prepare a Draft Mandatory 
Evacuation Order Before Katrina Approached the Gulf Coast  
• Ineffective execution of the National Response Plan. 
•  An under-trained and under-staffed Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. 
• A Catastrophic Incident Annex that was never invoked, and 
doubt that it would have done the job anyway.  
• A perplexing inability to learn from Hurricane Pam and other 
exercises. 
• Levees not built to withstand the most severe hurricanes. 
• An incomplete evacuation that led to deaths and tremendous 
suffering. 
• A complete breakdown in communications that paralysed 
command and control and made situational awareness murky 
at best. 
• The failure of state and local officials to maintain law and order. 
• Haphazard and incomplete emergency shelter and housing 
plans. 
• An overwhelmed FEMA logistics and contracting system that 
could not support the effective provision of urgently needed 
supplies. 
• The readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams 
was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal 
response. 
• DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced 
staff for the Katrina response. 
• Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees of 
unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the 
National Response Plan and National Incident Management 
System. 
• FEMA was unprepared—and has never been prepared—for 
a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina. 
• The Committee’s investigation found systemic and 
leadership failures, displayed in both the preparation for and 
response to Hurricane Katrina, at both the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. 
• The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)—
charged with providing reliable information to decision 
makers including the Secretary of DHS and the President—
failed to create a system to identify and acquire all available, 
relevant information, and as a result situational awareness 
was deeply flawed. 
• Long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded 
• The Committee believes that leadership failures needlessly 
compounded these losses. 
187 
 
• Lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level 
reflected confusing organizational structures in the field.  
• The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane 
Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in 
our current national preparedness system: the lack of 
expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and 
reconstruction. Insufficient planning, training, and 
interagency coordination are not problems that began and 
ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the 
need for greater integration and synchronization of 
preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal 
government, but also with the State and local governments 
and the private and non-profit sectors as well 
• Our current system for homeland security does not provide 
the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed 
by 21st Century catastrophic threats. 
• The Federal response suffered from significant organization 
and coordination problems during this week of crisis. 
• The lack of communications and situational awareness had a 
debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after 
coordinating elements were in place, Federal departments 
and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their 
standard procedures to this catastrophic incident 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The report highlighted using a case study on how 
decisions are made. Most of the time, gaps in 
decisions are made clearer after a disaster. 
The case study highlighted the fact that from the 
highest ranking officer to the lowest ranking officer 
who were involved with decision making, they failed 
to carry out the most important aspect of decision 
making during disasters, saving lives. There were 
breakdowns in the chain of command in all areas 
from evacuation planning to communication and 
sheltering to transport. I agree that it is not easy to 
find solutions to every disaster, but people at 
responsible places must carry out their duties or 
should get the required guidance and training. 
The laws of the country should be followed for an 
incident. In the United States, the following four are 
referred to as relevant for this incident. 
• Title VI of the Stafford Act also places 
significant responsibilities for national 
emergency preparedness on the FEMA 
Director and, through the Homeland Security 
Act, on DHS, providing, among other things, 
that the federal government is to provide the 
necessary direction, guidance, and 
assistance “so that a comprehensive 
preparedness system exists for all hazards.” 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
(HSPD-8) issued on December 17, 2003, 
further designated the Secretary as “the 
principal Federal official for coordinating the 
implementation of all-hazards preparedness 
in the United States.” 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5), issued by President Bush on 
February 28, 2003, formally designated the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as the 
“principal federal official for domestic 
incident management.” 
• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
established the Department and provides 
that one of DHS’s missions is “acting as a 
focal point regarding natural and manmade 
crises and emergency planning.” 
All the other responsibilities are aligned under these 
statutory regulations. As shown in the case study, the 
main failures were not following the standards that 
were adopted by the States.  
“As we are all aware, disasters are very political 
events,” said FEMA Director James Lee Witt. (Sobel 
& Leeson, 2006). Decision making varies according 
to many factors. In 2005, Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005–2015 (HFA) was formulated to provide 
the following strategies, three strategic goals: to 
integrate disaster risk reduction into sustainable 
development policies and planning; to develop and 
strengthen institutions, mechanisms, and capacities 
to build resilience to hazards; and to systematically 
incorporate risk reduction approaches into the 
implementation of emergency preparedness, 
response, and recovery programs (United Nations, 
2008). 
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